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No More Tiers?
Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple
Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases
By Donald L. Beschle*
Introduction
The Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution contains
no express provision calling for courts to balance the right of an
individual against the social cost of enforcing that right. This
stands in contrast to general twentieth-century constitutional
documents adopted by western democracies. The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 for example, provides that the
rights provided are “subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”2 Rights may be strong, but they are clearly
not absolute. The document itself calls for some sort of
balancing.
Does the absence of such an express constitutional provision
in the United States Constitution mean that rights are to be
protected as absolutes, or at the very least, that they may be
limited only to the extent necessary to protect other individual
rights rather than general social welfare concerns?3 A century
of Supreme Court opinions rejects this conclusion. Instead, the
Court has struggled to frame the appropriate balancing test
when confronted with a rights claim. Should there be a single
master balancing test, appropriate for all rights claims, or a
range of tests depending on the right claimed?
If some form of balancing is inevitable, what sort of
balancing test or tests is called for? Since the earliest days of
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
2. Id. § 1.
3. The position that rights always outweigh general social interests, and
may be limited only to further other rights, is most closely identified with
Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-94
(1978).
*
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individual rights litigation in the United States, the Supreme
Court has opted to apply different tests, different “tiers” of
analysis, depending on the classification of the right or interest
involved. The courts of most other western democracies have
opted instead for a single analytical framework, generally
labeled “proportionality” analysis.4 The American multi-tiered
approach might be expected to lead to more predictable
outcomes, yet, in recent decades, the application of these tests
has become progressively less determinative of outcomes. Strict
scrutiny seems not quite so strict; low level rational basis
analysis is not quite so deferential to government and the
creation of a new intermediate scrutiny, not to mention a range
of tests for specific First Amendment categories, has only added
to the confusion.
This article will explore how the explicit adoption of
proportionality analysis as a single analytical tool might lead,
not only to a more coherent approach to individual rights cases,
but will also bring together aspects of the current multiple
analytical tiers in a way that allows full consideration of both
the individual rights and the social values present in these
cases.
Part I of this article will give a brief overview of the history
of the creation and application of the various tiers of analysis
used by the United States Supreme Court and explore how the
once-sharp difference in those applications have blurred in
recent years. Part II will describe the proportionality analysis
used by other nations’ courts in a wide range of individual rights
cases. Part III will focus on how an explicit adoption of
proportionality might lead to significant improvement in the
analysis of cases presenting issues under the free exercise
clause, currently a particularly confusing and contentious source
of debate.

4. See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).
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I. The Three Tiers of Analysis: A Short History
Some form of balancing in the resolution of individual rights
claims under the United States Constitution is inevitable.
Occasionally, this will be due to the language of the relevant
constitutional provision itself, such as the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.5 But more
often, it will be due to the severe problems associated with any
attempt to declare that a right is absolute. Of course, one might
say that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments provide an
“absolute” right to “due process” of law,6 and the Eighth
Amendment
“absolutely”
bans
“cruel
and
unusual
punishments.”7 But in cases such as these, the balancing will
occur in the process of defining, rather than applying, the
provision.
There have been occasional defenders of the concept of
absolute constitutional rights, at least in specific contexts.
Justice Hugo Black famously advocated “absolute” protection of
speech under the First Amendment.8 But he was able to do so
only by excluding from his definition of the speech protected
absolutely a great deal of communicative behavior that his
colleagues brought within the protection of the Amendment.9 In
other words, he was employing his own version of balancing in
order to protect his commitment to absolutism. Ronald Dworkin
maintained that rights were “trumps” that always outweighed
mere societal interests.10 But that did not eliminate the need to
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
7. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
8. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
Black, J., dissenting) (insisting that material considered obscene was still
entitled to First Amendment protection); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 580-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting any reasonableness test in
cases involving advocacy of subversive activity).
9. Justice Black would not have given First Amendment protection to
public school students protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War
by wearing black armbands. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). Nor would he give First
Amendment protection to a protester wearing a jacket with an offensive word
on it in public. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Black, J., dissenting).
10. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 3.
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engage in a form of balancing in defining the scope of the right.
And, of course, when rights conflict with other rights, a different
type of balancing is required.
Balancing, thus, is inevitable in some form. Of course, it
still has its critics. Balancing two things of the same kind may
yield predictable results, but how does one confidently balance
things that are unlike each other?11 Does that uncertainty give
the balancer too much leeway to simply impose his or her own
preferences? Does the indeterminacy of balancing delegitimize
the entire project? In theory, perhaps, and yet experience shows
that some form of balancing in constitutional rights cases is
inevitable.
But conceding the inevitability of balancing is just the first
step. What kind of balancing to employ? Those suspicious of the
indeterminacy of balancing would be expected to try to make it
more determinate.
And one way to try to minimize
indeterminacy is to do your balancing at the wholesale, rather
than the retail, level. In other words, declare that categories of
individual activity (or government action), after weighing their
significance against the competing interest, cut so sharply in
favor or against permitting the right to prevail, that a decision
in any individual case falling within this category becomes
nearly automatic. Against this background, the evolution of
“tier” related constitutional analysis can be understood.
The 1905 Supreme Court case of Lochner v. New York12 can
be viewed as the starting point for development of what would
become at least two of the tiers of modern constitutional rights
analysis. The 5-4 decision invalidating New York’s statutory
limits on the hours worked by those employed as bakers
produced three opinions, one for the Court majority, and two in
dissent. Justice Peckham, writing for the majority, found that
the right to freely contract with regard to labor conditions was
well-recognized and subsumed in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.13 This would require New York to satisfy a
11. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting that attempting to balance
incommensurate interests is “like judging whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy”).
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. Id. at 52-53.
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stringent test to justify the regulation. To be valid, it would need
to be shown necessary to promote the important state interest
in health and safety.14 Applying what would evolve into the
modern strict scrutiny test, Justice Peckham invalidated the
statute.15
Sharply dissenting, Justice Holmes advocated a highly
deferential approach to a legislative choice to regulate when the
regulation was challenged under the Due Process Clause.16
Justice Holmes would invalidate the statute only when it was
clear that no rational legislator could have believed the
legislation was a reasonable step toward achieving a legitimate
goal.17 The Holmes approach would grow into what would later
be designated the low-level rational basis or minimal scrutiny
test. For decades, the approaches of Justices Peckham and
Holmes would contend for recognition in a variety of
constitutional contexts.
As those following Justice Peckham and those following
Justice Holmes would contend over the years, the third opinion
in Lochner seemed to fade into the background, if not disappear
entirely from the conversation. Justice Harlan, writing in
dissent for himself and two colleagues, rejected Justice
Peckham’s approach, but would not go quite so far in deference
to the legislature as Justice Holmes.18 Harlan would defer to the
state when the state could produce a reasonable amount of
evidence in support of the health and safety purpose and effect
of the statute, with no further need to weigh that evidence
against evidence to the contrary, or to insist on the absolute
necessity of the state’s act.19 This middle-ground alternative to
strict or minimal scrutiny would receive little attention for quite
some time.

14. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 64-65.
16. Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 76.
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-72 (1905) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
19. Id. at 69 (“[T]he court may inquire whether the means devised by the
State are germane to an end which may be lawfully accomplished and have a
real or substantial relation to the protection of health”). The court should not
interfere merely because the means are “not the wisest or best.” Id. at 68.
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If the virtue of what would become known as strict scrutiny
was, at least in part, its predictability, the three decades of the
Lochner era are somewhat puzzling. Instead of consistently
rejecting state law regulating working conditions, the Supreme
Court decisions turned on the Court’s view of just what types of
workers and industries truly required regulation.20 And so,
while bakers working hours could not be regulated, those of
miners could;21 women could receive protection that men could
not;22 and despite the obvious practical connection between
workers’ wages and hours, states could not regulate wages, even
where hours were subject to limitation.23 Did the Peckham
approach clarify the law, or merely install the Supreme Court as
a supreme legislature?
Lochner, of course, did not survive. In a series of cases in
the 1930s and 1940s, the Court made it clear that state
regulation of economic matters would be subject only to the lowlevel rational basis scrutiny advocated by Justice Holmes in his
Lochner dissent.24 But a significant question remained: Was
Lochner wrong because its early version of strict scrutiny was
always inappropriate, or only because that test was applied in
the wrong category of cases? The Court began to address this
question in the late 1930s.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co.,25 Justice Stone,
writing for the Court, included what is usually regarded as the
most famous footnote in Supreme Court history. His “footnote
4” suggested that a heightened level of scrutiny would be
appropriate where the Court was faced with one of three types
20. Id. at 54-59 (recognizing that “the kind of employment” and “the
character of the employe[e]s” might make it reasonable and proper for the
State to interfere to prevent the employees from being constrained by the rules
laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor).
21. Id. at 75 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding
maximum hour legislation applying to underground miners)).
22. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hour
legislation for women workers).
23. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating
legislation creating a minimum wage for women workers).
24. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 525, and upholding the minimum wage statute); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a price regulation of milk aimed at
stabilizing output during Great Depression).
25. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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of legislation.26 The first was a statute in conflict with a
specifically enumerated constitutional right.
The second
included statutes that interfered with the proper functioning of
the democratic process. And finally, heightened scrutiny would
be called for when a statute disadvantaged a “discrete and
insular” minority group.27
The 1944 case of Korematsu v. United States28 presented the
Court with a clear example of a statute disadvantage, a “discrete
and insular” racial minority. The case challenged the World War
II practice of removing Japanese-Americans from the West
Coast to internment camps for the duration of the war.29 In
language that can be seen as the birth of the modern, postLochner era, strict scrutiny test, the Court declared that only
“[p]ressing public necessity” could justify the practice.30 But,
ironically, the case that revived strict scrutiny also stands as the
only Supreme Court decision in modern times that held that a
facially racial classification was justified by such necessity.31
History has largely repudiated the holding of Korematsu (and
vindicated the dissenting opinions of Justices Jackson, Murphy,
and Roberts),32 but the principle of subjecting racial
classification to a test of “pressing public necessity” survives,
and demonstrated its power in Brown v. Board of Education33
and subsequent cases invalidating government sponsored racial
discrimination.
By the early 1960s the test that could trace its history back
to Lochner had gained a new name: “strict scrutiny.” The
“pressing public necessity” standard of Korematsu had been
unpacked in a two-step requirement. Government, in order to
satisfy strict scrutiny, must demonstrate that the statute had a
compelling purpose, and was necessary to achieve the purpose
26. Id. at 152 n.4.
27. Id.
28. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
29. Id. at 216-17.
30. Id. at 216.
31. Id. at 223-24.
32.
In 1988, Congress enacted legislation acknowledging the
“fundamental injustice” of the relocation program and providing restitution to
Japanese-Americans forced to leave their homes. Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-338, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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(often referred to as the absence of any less restrictive
alternative).34 Early application of strict scrutiny went beyond
the context of equal protection cases involving race, to include
First Amendment claims, both involving free speech35 and free
exercise,36 and cases involving voting rights.37
Each of these applications fell within the boundaries of
Justice Stone’s “footnote 4” suggestion of the proper scope of
heightened scrutiny.38 More controversial, however, was the
Court’s revival of substantive due process in Griswold v.
Connecticut.39 Connecticut’s longstanding, but rarely, if ever,
enforced, prohibition on the use of contraceptives that extended
even to married couples did not implicate an enumerated
constitutional right, despite Justice Douglas’s contention that
the privacy right involved was part of the “penumbra” of Bill of
Rights provisions,40 and Justice Goldberg’s reference to the open
ended language of the Ninth Amendment.41 While Griswold’s
narrow holding with respect to the privacy rights of married
couples with respect to contraceptive decisions would not by
itself change much state or federal law, the recognition of
privacy, without a clear definition of the concept’s scope, as a
fundamental right that triggered strict scrutiny analysis of any
government limitation would lead to intense controversy in
subsequent years.
By the 1960s, the crucial nature of the Supreme Court’s
initial decision on rights was evident.
Professor Gerald
Gunther, perhaps the era’s most respected constitutional
scholar, famously stated that strict scrutiny was a test “strict in
theory, fatal in fact”,42 in other words, essentially calling for per
34. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
35. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994)
(holding content-sensitive restrictions subject to strict scrutiny).
36. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding the denial of
religiously based exemption from statutory duty to accept Saturday work as a
condition of receiving state unemployment benefits is subject to strict
scrutiny).
37. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966)
(invalidating poll tax).
38. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. Id. at 483.
41. Id. at 486-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
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se invalidation of the state action. On the other hand, low-level
rational basis scrutiny, following the lead of Holmes in his
Lochner dissent, essentially led to a finding of per se validity.
But as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, the supposed clarity
of the two-tier analysis that led to automatic outcomes began to
show cracks. Perhaps most obviously, this took place in the
Supreme Court’s gender discrimination cases. Prior to 1971, the
Court had never suggested that a distinction made by the
government on the basis of sex was in any way suspect. To the
contrary, the Court upheld such distinctions with little
analysis.43 In the 1971 case of Reed v. Reed,44 however, the Court
struck down a gender-based classification for the first time.
Idaho provided that in appointing an administrator for the
estate of a decedent who died without a will the probate court
should, when male and female relatives of the decedent were of
the same relation to him or her, choose the male relative.45 The
Court struck down the statutory provision, but claimed to be
doing so after applying only minimal rational basis scrutiny.46
The State had defended the statute as in pursuance of efficiency
by eliminating the need for a hearing on the qualifications of the
male and female relatives, and the presumption that the male
would likely have more experience with financial matters.47
While the stereotyping is obvious today in the latter conclusion,
could it be said in 1971 that such a presumption was entirely
irrational under the highly deferential sense that Holmes had
advocated? Was Reed actually a strict scrutiny case that could
not bring itself to declare its actual analytical basis?

Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794
(2006) (referring to an analysis of the extent to which Gunther’s quip is still
accurate).
43. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding jury selection
system that excluded women except those who affirmatively indicated desire
to serve); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan statute
prohibiting women who were not wives or daughters of tavern owners from
working there as a bartender); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)
(upholding Illinois restriction of bar membership for law practice to men).
44. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 76 (holding that a classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary).
47. Id. at 74.
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Two years later, the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson48
seemed to shift to a strict scrutiny analysis for gender
discrimination cases. The Court invalidated the federal statute
that created a presumption that the civilian wife of a male
member of the military was financially dependent on him,
entitling the couple to spousal benefits, while requiring a civilian
husband to establish actual dependency on his military wife’s
income.49 Justice Brennan, writing for a four-justice plurality,
found that this gender-based distinction should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny.50 He was joined by four concurring justices
who did not specify the level of scrutiny they thought
appropriate.51 Nevertheless, many thought that Frontiero had
made strict scrutiny the appropriate test for gender
discrimination claims in the future.
But a series of cases over the next few years made that
assumption highly questionable. Using language that sounded
more like rational basis than strict scrutiny analysis, the Court
struck down two statutory distinctions between males and
females and upheld two others.52 Finally, in 1976 the Court
resolved the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny in
gender discrimination cases. In Craig v. Boren,53 the Court
invalidated Oklahoma’s different male and female ages for
alcohol consumption.54 In doing so, it turned neither to minimal
48. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
49. Id. at 679-80.
50. Id. at 688.
51. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is unnecessary for the Court
in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification”) Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell’s concurrence. Justice
Stevens wrote a one-sentence concurrence, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Id.
52. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975)
(invalidating a Social Security Act provision enabling widowed mothers, but
not widowed fathers, to benefit based on earnings of deceased spouse);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating a
regulation requiring school teachers to take maternity leave long before their
due date). But see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (upholding
federal statute allowing women in the Navy a longer period of time in which to
earn promotion than men before being discharged); Kahn v. Shevin 416 U.S.
351, 360 (1974) (upholding property tax exemption for widows but not
widowers).
53. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
54. Id. at 210.
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or strict scrutiny, but settled on a new third tier, less rigorous
than strict scrutiny, but more so than low-level rational basis
analysis. Logically enough, this test would become known as
intermediate scrutiny.55 To defend a sex-based classification,
government would now need to demonstrate an important
(rather than either a compelling or merely legitimate) state
interest and demonstrate a substantial (rather than either a
necessary or minimally rational) reason for recognizing gender
differences in addressing the state interest.56 Unsurprisingly,
this new level of scrutiny would lead to less certain outcomes.57
As a new tier of analysis was born, developments in cases
involving both low-level scrutiny and strict scrutiny were
making those tests somewhat less determinative. A series of
Supreme Court decisions applying the minimal rational basis
test nevertheless invalidated the challenged government action
by finding that the asserted government intent was illegitimate.
In United States v. Moreno,58 the Court invalidated an
amendment to the Food Stamp Act that had the effect of
disqualifying low-income unrelated adults who were living
together from the program.59 The Court found that the
amendment was motivated by simple hostility to “hippie”
lifestyle choices, and not to any legitimate purpose of the Act.60
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,61 the Court declined to
apply heightened scrutiny to a local zoning decision refusing a
special use permit for the operation of a group home for mentally
disabled residents. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the
decision under rational basis analysis, finding that the decision
was a product of “irrational prejudice” against the mentally

55. Id. at 197.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding selective
service registration requirement imposed only on males); Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape
statue punishing teenage male but not teenage female rapists). But see United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating state military academy
restriction to male cadets); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding
preemptory challenges to jurors based on sex unconstitutional).
58. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
59. Id. at 529-30.
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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disabled.62
Two decades later, the Court would invalidate an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that would
prohibit the state or any subdivision from enacting legislation
that protected gays and lesbians from discrimination.63 Noting
that a wide range of other groups, not protected as suspect
classes under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, could freely seek legislative protection from
discrimination by their states, the Colorado amendment’s
closing off any such legislative protection for only a single class
of citizens could be seen as resting on nothing more than mere
hostility toward that group.64 Under cases such as Moreno, such
hostility could not serve as a legitimate purpose.65
Romer v. Evans,66 the Colorado amendment case, would
foreshadow subsequent decisions on homosexual rights.
Lawrence v. Texas67 struck down the Texas statute that
criminalized homosexual activity. In doing so, the Court neither
held that sexual orientation was a suspect classification for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, nor that consensual
sexual activity by adults was a fundamental right for purposes
of Due Process analysis, but rather applied the rational basis
test.68 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found that the
fact that the statute might accurately reflect the moral
sentiments of most Texans was inadequate to provide a
legitimate state interest for the statute.69 Unsurprisingly,
dissenting justices noted that legislative enforcement of
majoritarian views of immorality was hardly uncommon,70 and
had been widely assumed to be valid. The Supreme Court’s

62. Id. at 450.
63. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
64. Id. at 634-35.
65. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 528 (1973).
66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
67. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68. Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest”).
69. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a state has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice”).
70. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196)
(“The law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality”).
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Obergefell71 decision, striking down state restrictions on samesex marriage, while often seen as the third case in the Court’s
gay rights trilogy, could expressly employ strict scrutiny based
upon the earlier recognition of marriage as a fundamental
right.72 Lawrence, however, claims to be a minimal scrutiny
case, expanding the earlier holding that mere hostility to a group
cannot serve as a legitimate state interest73 to include the
principle that majority views of immorality, standing alone, are
also insufficient to justify a restriction on personal liberty.
Just as minimal rational basis scrutiny can no longer be
seen as leading to automatic affirmance of the challenged
statute, strict scrutiny can no longer be seen as, in Gunther’s
formulation, “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”74 This is most
evident in the Supreme Court’s treatment of race-based
affirmative action programs in higher education. In the Court’s
1977 Bakke75 decision rejecting the suggestion of dissenting
justices that a program using race to compensate racial
minorities for their earlier victimization should be subjected to
only intermediate scrutiny when challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause,76 the Court held that strict scrutiny would be
applied to racial classification regardless of which racial group
was disadvantaged.77 While the affirmative action program was
invalidated, dicta in Justice Powell’s opinion suggested that
some such programs could survive.78 After decades of debate
over the significance of Powell’s dicta, more recent cases have
shown that selective institutions of higher learning may, in fact,
use race as a factor in admissions decisions when it is done in a

71. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
72. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (using strict scrutiny to
strike down state refusal to grant marriage license to man in arrears on child
support payment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating
prohibition on interracial marriage).
73. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973).
74. See Winkler, supra note 42.
75. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76. Id. at 356-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 305.
78. Id. at 316-17 (discussing with approval the Harvard College
undergraduate admissions program).
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narrowly tailored way, despite the rigor of strict scrutiny.79
In 1963, the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny was
the appropriate test to use in assessing a state’s refusal to grant
an exemption to a generally applicate statute where the
exemption was sought on the grounds of the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment.80 As will be discussed in more detail
below, after a few subsequent cases applying strict scrutiny to
insist that the state grant the exemption,81 the Court began a
string of free exercise cases that upheld the government’s
decision, either by carving out an exception to strict scrutiny or
by declaring that the government had satisfied the test.82 By
1990, free exercise analysis had become so muddled that Justice
Scalia, writing for a five justice majority could claim that strict
scrutiny never actually was the Court’s standard.83 The Court’s
Smith decision held that strict scrutiny would apply in free
exercise claims only where the statute or practice of government
was not one generally applicable, but rather singled out religious
believers for disadvantage out of hostility toward religion.84 In
other cases, minimal scrutiny would suffice.
The struggle to settle on an appropriate tier of analysis has
been obvious in the debate over abortion rights. In 1973, Roe v.
Wade85 held that strict scrutiny would be applied to any

79. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding
affirmative action plan at the University of Texas); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action plan at University of Michigan
Law School).
80. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
81. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (unemployment benefits cannot be denied to pacifist who quit rather
than work on building military equipment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (Old Order Amish granted exemption from statute requiring that
children remain in formal schooling until age 16).
82. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding
prison regulation prohibiting Islamic inmates from holding Friday religious
service using reasonableness standard); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986) (Orthodox Jewish military officer not entitled to exemption from
military uniform regulations).
83. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resc. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 87879 (1990).
84. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (ordinance applying only to religious ritualistic animal sacrifice
invalidated under strict scrutiny).
85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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government attempt to limit first and second-trimester
abortions. In Roe’s wake, strict scrutiny in its traditional
rigorous form led to a fairly consistent series of decisions striking
down regulations short of criminalization.86 But as political
opposition to abortion rights grew in the 1980s, significant
judicial opposition followed. With changes in the composition of
the Supreme Court by the end of the decade, many foresaw the
Court reversing Roe and returning abortion restrictions to
analysis under minimal scrutiny.
In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey87 presented the Court
with an opportunity to reaffirm Roe-like scrutiny or to return
abortion restitutions to pre-Roe minimal scrutiny. Neither
posits could command the votes of a majority. Four justices did
call for abandoning Roe’s strict scrutiny and returning to the
rational basis test.88 Two justices, in contrast, strongly defended
strict scrutiny.89 Justices O’Connor, Souter and Kennedy joined
neither approach, and in a joint opinion, put forward a middle
ground.90
Rather than simply invoking intermediate scrutiny, the
joint opinion added an analytical step that divided abortion
restrictions into two categories. If a restriction posed an “undue
burden” that would stand as a significant obstacle to a woman’s
pre-viability abortion, strict scrutiny would be applied.91 If the
regulation did not present such a burden, rational basis analysis
would be sufficient.92 The undue burden test clearly makes
outcomes less determinate. In Casey itself, it led to the
invalidation of only one of three challenged Pennsylvania’s
statutory provisions.93 And in the two significant Supreme
86. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (invalidating requirement that all abortions after the first trimester
be performed in hospitals); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (invalidating requirement that a married woman gain consent of her
husband for an abortion).
87. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
88. Id. at 944-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 912-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting part); id.
at 922-943 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 843-911.
91. Id. at 874-77.
92. Id.
93. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 987-88 (1992) (striking
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Court decisions involving abortion restrictions since Casey, the
Court has decided one in favor of the state, and one against. In
Gonzalez v. Carhart,94 the Court upheld a federal statute
prohibiting a particular method of late-term abortion.95 Justice
Kennedy cast the deciding vote and wrote the Court’s opinion,
while his co-author of Casey’s joint opinion, Justice Souter,
dissented.96 More recently, however, Justice Kennedy joined the
majority opinion of Justice Breyer in Whole Women’s Health
Center v. Hellerstedt,97 which struck down a number of Texas
statutory regulations on abortion providers.
First Amendment free speech cases have developed their
own context-specific tests. While there are a few general
principles, for example, that content-sensitive regulation will
receive greater scrutiny than content-neutral provisions, it can
be stated that a wide range of tests have emerged depending on
the category of speech regulated and the nature of the
regulation. Some of these resemble strict scrutiny,98 others
suggest a more rational basis analysis.99 Still, others seem to
suggest an intermediate scrutiny, either in their stated
standards or their application.100 Government acts or statutes
imposing subsequent punishment on speech,101 those that
impose prior restraints by administrative or judicial action,102
and those that merely regulate time, place, and manner,103 are
down spousal notification requirement).
94. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
95. Id. at 134-136.
96. Id. at 169-191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97. See Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
98. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (strong protection for
symbolic political speech).
99. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1980)
(zoning ordinance limiting “adult motion picture theatres” upheld).
100. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate test applied to regulation of commercial speech).
101. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (hate speech must
present “true threat” in order to warrant punishment); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech must satisfy an incitement standard to validate
punishing speech).
102. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123
(1992) (denial of parade permit may not be based on content of the speech);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (injunctions against speech held to
extremely high standard).
103. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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subjected to different levels of scrutiny, even where the category
of speech involved is fully within First Amendment protection.
First Amendment claims seeking access to public property
for speech activity are subject to different analysis depending on
the classification of the property involved as a public forum or
not.104 And a range of speech categories once thought to be
beyond the scope of the First Amendment, such as defamation,105
commercial speech,106 obscenity,107 and others, have been given
at least limited protection under their own category-specific
tests. And as new media emerges, courts must determine
whether to create new tests or to fit them into existing
categories. While the elements of this myriad of tests overlap to
some extent, it is still necessary to recognize their separate
identity and their separate aspects. Just recalling the names of
the tests, usually derived from the Supreme Court case first or
most clearly enunciating them, can be a challenge.
More than a century after Lochner had laid down the
building blocks of strict scrutiny and minimal rationality as
alternative approaches in constitutional rights cases, we have
seen the heirs of Justice Peckham and Justice Holmes contend
for preeminence, but recent decades have seen, across a number
of constitutional contexts, unease with either of those sharply
opposed positions. This has led to a number of approaches
pushing the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests away from
leading to near per se validity or invalidity of statutes, and the
creation to new analytical tools standing between the two classic
opposites. A new generation of jurists seem to be rediscovering
the wisdom of the often forgotten Lochner dissent of Justice
Harlan, seeking some middle ground,108 one more deferential
than strict scrutiny, but requiring more analysis than Holmes
would require.
(regulations aimed at excessive noise upheld).
104. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992) (airport concourses).
105. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (standards
applied in cases of “public figures” and others); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (alleged defamation of public official).
106. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
107. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
108. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The virtue of the strict scrutiny—minimal scrutiny dyad
would seem to lie in its greater degree of predictability. The
alternatives are more indeterminate, in the interest of taking
account of the context of specific decisions. Each of the tests asks
important questions, but is there a way to preserve the value of
these questions yet end the judicial quibbling over which the
appropriate labelled test is being applied as it should be, or is
merely another test in disguise?
II. Proportionality: An Alternative to Current Approaches
Proportionality is hardly a new concept. As a principle that
demands that a balance be struck, it can appear in private
decision-making, under the guise of cost-benefit analysis.
Whether under the label of cost-benefit analysis or otherwise,
decisions by legislators and government regulators constantly
employ proportionality analysis.109 While the outcomes of such
analysis may be controversial, the use of proportionality
balancing is hardly controversial. Indeed, it is inevitable.
Whether legislation sets the extent of punishment for particular
crimes,110 the amount of tolerable pollution discharged from
factories,111 the relative rights of landlords and tenants,112 or
innumerable other things, balances must be struck.
When we take proportionality out of the legislative or
administrative realm and look at it when used by courts to
review the balances struck by the political branches, its
legitimacy may be seen as less obvious. Legislators must, after
all, balance; they have no choice. Judges, on the other hand, can
109. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 13-26 (2009) (tracing the concept back to early
“just war” principles).
110. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (discussing the provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986 and its provisions treating possession and sale of crack cocaine for more
seriously than the possession and sale of powder cocaine).
111. See Citizens Against Refinery’s Effects, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981) (discussing Clean Air Act of 1967).
112. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) available at
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2490&c
ontext=mlr.
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always simply defer rather than do their own balancing.113
Judicial invocation of proportionality balancing is least
controversial, of course, when judges are framing common law
doctrine. Here, they are acting as a sort of quasi-legislator, but
in a well-accepted context.
And so, the common law principle that contract damages are
limited to compensating foreseeable losses, as well as the
principle that contract damages must be compensatory rather
than punitive, were framed by judges using common law
reasoning.114 In tort law, Judge Learned Hand famously framed
a balancing test to apply to the thorny problem of proximate
cause.115 When judges engage in proportionality analysis to
review the decisions of other decision makers, however, the
results can be more controversial.
In criminal law contexts, whether under the label of
“reasonableness,” proportionality, or elsewhere, the concept is
well represented. Drawing its authority from the constitutional
prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment and excessive
fines,116 as well as the general guarantee of due process,117 the
Supreme Court has placed at least some limits on the severity of
criminal punishment, sometimes making explicit reference to
the concept of proportionality.118 While continuing to reject the
contention that the death penalty is always a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, the Court has set forth limitations on its
use based in proportionality review. In Coker v. Georgia,119 the
Court held that the death penalty for rape was grossly
disproportionate. The Court laid down the following test:

113. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 10-15 (2015)
(discussing different roles assumed by judges, specifically the “soldier” role,
where judges believe in simply “following orders” in deferring to other branches
of government).
114. See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 109, at 37-49.
115. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
116. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
117. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
118. See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 109, at 91-168, for an overview of
the use of proportionality in U.S. Supreme Court cases involving criminal
justice issues.
119. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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[A]
punishment
is
“excessive”
and
unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or
(2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime.120
A punishment is disproportionate when it no longer bears a
sufficient relationship to the goals of punishment recognized as
legitimate–primarily deterrence and retribution.121 The “cruel
and unusual” language of the Eighth Amendment, then,
implicitly includes a prohibition on excessive punishment. And
because even the most draconian punishment might achieve
some degree of deterrent or retributive effect, the implication is
clear that the punishment must be somewhat more effective in
securing these ends than an easily identifiable and available
lesser punishment. In Coker, that was life imprisonment.122
The Court has been much more reluctant to recognize a
proportionality requirement in reviewing the length of prison
terms. In Solem v. Helm,123 the only case in which the Court has
found a prison sentence to be unconstitutionally lengthy, Justice
Powell’s opinion for the Court stated that while legislative
judgments on prison terms were entitled to great deference and
a reversal of such legislative decisions should be “exceedingly
rare,” courts were empowered to weigh proportionality in such
cases by examining, (1) “the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty,”124 (2) “the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction,”125 and (3) “compar[ison of]
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”126 A few years later, the Court rejected a claim
that a mandatory life sentence for a first offense of possession of
120. Id. at 592 (citation omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 594 (the Court noted the strong trend in state legislatures
against capital punishment for rape).
123. See generally Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
124. Id. at 291.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 291-92.
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a significant amount of cocaine was unconstitutional.127 Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disputed the
contention that the length of a prison term could ever violate the
Eighth Amendment.128
Three concurring justices recognized the possibility that a
prison sentence could be unconstitutionally disproportionate,
but found that the “narrow” proportionality principle of Solem
should be invoked to overturn legislative judgments in such
cases where
“extreme
sentences . . .
[were] ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the crime.”129
The Supreme Court has yet to find that a fine violated the
Excessive Fines Clause due to its disproportion to the offense,
but the Court has invoked the Clause to invalidate a civil or
criminal forfeiture.130 To the extent that the forfeiture is
designed to punish rather than simply act in a remedial way, the
forfeiture could not be “grossly disproportionate” to the gravity
and harm caused by the offense.131
Shifting attention from the Eighth Amendment to the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the Court’s engagement
in some degree of social cost-benefit analysis is obvious, and, to
some extent, inevitable. The Fourth Amendment bar on
“unreasonable” searches requires balancing of some sort. The
Court’s frequent return to the scope of the Miranda132 doctrine
seems to be a textbook example of cost-benefit analysis, as does
the Court’s determination of the Sixth Amendment insofar as it
requires the state to provide counsel for indigent defendants.133
Apart from criminal law issues, the Supreme Court has
employed proportionality review in a few contexts not falling
into the category of rights cases that traditionally call for the use
127. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
128. Id. at 994-95.
129. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted).
130. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334-40 (1998).
131. Id. See also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993).
132. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that criminal
defendants are entitled to information on their rights to silence).
133. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent
defendants are entitled to appointed counsel); SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note
109, at 95-114 (discussing the explicit and implicit use of proportionality
principles in the Supreme Court’s definition of the rights of criminal
defendants).
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of one of the three recognized tiers of review. The first context
involves the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases. In
1989, the Court rejected the contention that the Eight
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause was relevant in cases not
involving
government-imposed
punitive
measures.134
Subsequent cases, however, found that the Due Process Clause
could serve as a basis for limiting punitive damages, as such
damages were entitled to a presumption of validity, and rejected
the use of the traditional heightened scrutiny tiers of review to
such awards.135
Finally, in BMW v. Gore136 and State Farm v. Campbell,137
the Court invalidated punitive damage awards as excessive, and
established a framework for assessing such awards under the
Due Process Clause. First, the trial court should assess the
blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct and the actual and
potential harm caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts.138
Second, the size of the punitive damage award should be
proportionate to the actual harm.139 Unless the defendant’s acts
were particularly egregious, the Court suggested that a ratio of
more than a single-digit to one of the punitive to compensatory
damages would be suspect.140 Finally, a trial court should
consider whether a punitive damage award was necessary to
deter future misconduct.141
In considering when the imposition of conditions on
landowners seeking development permits might violate the
Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
Supreme Court held that a valid condition must be “roughly
proportional” in its goals of alleviating the public burdens
created by the proposed development.142 As in the case of
punitive damages, the test is relatively easy to state, however it
134. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257 (1989).
135. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
136. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
137. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
138. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-80.
139. Id. at 580-82.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 583-85.
142. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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may be difficult to calculate in an individual case. Does the
condition go beyond simply alleviating the threatened public
harm caused by the development?143
These discrete references to proportionality in cases calling
for a form of cost-benefit analysis show that the Supreme Court
has recognized the usefulness of the concept. But how, if at all,
can that be applied in cases involving equal protection,
substantive due process, or First Amendment issues? Would
proportionality threaten the insights developed in the
application of the three tiers of analysis currently in use?
Western democracies have developed proportionality tests
for the application of rights provisions that, while perhaps
differing in detail, employ similar analytical steps.144 An
examination of these steps will reveal their similarity to the
analytical steps required in the application of the tier-based
analysis used in the United States. The first step is to determine
whether the specific claim falls within the scope of the
constitutional right.145 While many cases will fall easily either
within or without the scope of the rights, some will not be that
clear.146 And if the determination of the initial question is
resolved within a system limiting the treatment of claims to two
options, one leading to essentially guaranteeing that the claim
will prevail (strict scrutiny) and the other promising almost
inevitable rejection of the claim (minimal scrutiny), the
resolution of this threshold question is critical.
A clear example in First Amendment speech clause
jurisprudence involves the activity usually designated as
“symbolic speech,” that is, activity not involving the use of words

143. Id. at 391.
144. See generally BARAK, supra note 4 (probably the most comprehensive
single volume overview of the use of proportionality in individual rights cases
decided by courts in western democracies).
145. Id. at 45-83. Barak maintains that a constitutional rights provision
should be interpreted “generously.” Id. at 69 (citing, among other cases, the
Supreme Court of Canada’s statement in R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295 (Can.) (interpreting freedom of conscience provision of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms)).
146. The United States Supreme Court has had to wrestle, for example,
with the issue of what belief systems qualify as “religions” since the 1960s. See
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965).
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but conveying a message.147 Over the years, the Supreme Court
has developed a relatively generous test to resolve the question
of when wordless activity can qualify for the First Amendment
protection.148 But at the same time, the Court was developing
analytical tests that rejected absolute protection in favor of some
type of balancing. Justice Black, famous for his advocacy of
absolute First Amendment protections, objected to the Court’s
extension of the protection to forms of wordless activity.149 Both
Black and his judicial adversaries seem to have clearly
understood that no legal system can provide absolute
constitutional protections without limiting the scope of the right
entitled to such protection.150
Similarly, the development of the Due Process privacy right
established in Griswold have largely turned on the disposition
of this initial analytical question. If the consequences of placing
something within the scope of the Griswold privacy right leads
to near absolute protection, we can anticipate a reluctance by
the Court to take that step. On the other hand, a narrow scope
of the privacy right, to the extent that it deprives the claimant
of any chance of success, will be unacceptable to a more rightssensitive decision-maker. While proportionately requires the
same initial step as the current tier-sensitive approach, the
stakes of this step are less dramatic. If including a particular
claim within the scope of a right does not guarantee that the
claimant will prevail, but only opens the door to further analysis,
we might expect that the courts will be more open to a broad
scope of such rights as privacy or free speech.
At this point, it would also be helpful to assess the weight of
the alleged right.151 Whether framed in terms of a dichotomy
147. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
148. “In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have
asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.’” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (alteration in original)
(quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
149. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right
Require a Narrow Definition of “Religion”?, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357
(2012).
151. The weight of the right will come into play in the final, “balancing”
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between rights that are “fundamental” and those less weighty,
or on a scale recognizing different levels of significance, the
weight of the right will come into play later in the analysis of the
state’s action for its proportionality.152 But it is important to
note that the absence of a right traditionally labelled
“fundamental” does not end the analysis. Only a determination
that the claim is outside the scope of the right entirely will do
that.
The next step of a proportionality analysis, unsurprisingly,
is the identification of the state’s interest, or as some courts put
it, the “public purpose” of the limitation of the right.153 American
courts do this routinely in an effort to label the state’s interest
as “compelling,” “important,” or merely “legitimate.” The failure
to satisfy the court that the state’s interest is “compelling” (or at
least important) will essentially invalidate the state action if it
conflicts with a right deemed “fundamental.”154 But if the scope
of rights that are fundamental is unclear, the lines between
compelling, important, and merely legitimate state interests are
perhaps even more so. Rather than allowing the categorization
of government interests to essentially cut the analysis short,
typical proportionality review will ask only whether the interest
is proper.155 The strength of the interest will come into play at
a later stage. Only the failure to identify a “proper” interest will
end the analysis. This is not significantly different from the
outcome of American cases where the state has fallen short of
even establishing a legitimate interest.
The third step in the proportionality analysis will be to
determine whether there is a rational relationship between the
state’s proper interest and the steps taken that allegedly violate
the asserted right.156 Of course, such a step could be taken with
varying degrees of rigor. As was the case with the two prior
tests, it would seem that a more generous view would be
appropriate. In short, this step incorporates something very
step of the proportionality test. See BARAK, supra note 4, at 359-67.
152. Id.
153. BARAK, supra note 4, at 245-98.
154. See supra notes 12-53 and accompanying text, for the discussion of
the traditional tiers of review.
155. The proper purpose test is a “threshold” test that entails no need to
balance. BARAK, supra note 4, at 246-47.
156. Id. at 303-16.
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similar to the minimum scrutiny applied in American cases
lacking a claim of a fundamental right. Only a disconnect so
striking as to suggest that the stated purpose of the state action
is actually a pretense will fail to satisfy this step.157
The fourth step of the proportionality analysis is often
framed as an inquiry into whether the state’s action is
“necessary” to satisfy the state’s purpose.158 To American
lawyers, the term will evoke strict scrutiny, and serve as an
almost insurmountable obstacle to successfully defining the
state action. But typically, judicial systems invoking the
proportionality analysis do not apply this test in its rigid form
that makes it nearly a per se rule of invalidity.159 Rather than
insist on absolute necessity, or the absence of any conceivable
less restrictive alternative, however burdensome that
alternative might be, proportionality at this stage asks whether
there is a reasonably clear and practical alternative that would
satisfy the proper government interest to substantially the same
extent that this challenged practice does.160 Note the difference
here between this “necessity” test and the usual application of
the test in the American strict scrutiny analysis. Under strict
scrutiny, the existence of a less restrictive alternative that would
allow the government to pursue the proper purpose, but to a
lesser extent, should lead to invalidation of the current
restriction. But in the proportionality test, only the presence of
an alternative that does not impose costs to government in its
pursuit of proper goals stops the analysis at this point and
decides in favor of the right claim.161 But if no such alternative
exists, analysis proceeds to the final step, the balancing test that
is of the essence of proportionality.
Prior to this point, the analysis of each step skews against
an early resolution of the case by requiring less of both the rights
157. The rational basis component “is not a balancing test,” ruling out
only government acts that entirely fail to advance the proper purpose. Id. at
315.
158. Id. at 317-39.
159. A law fails the necessity test only where an available alternative
“can fulfill the law’s purpose at the same level of intensity and efficiency as the
means determined by the limiting law.” Id. at 323.
160. Id.
161. The necessity test, like the rational basis test, is a “threshold” test,
not an ultimate balancing test. BARAK, supra note 4, at 338-39.
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of the claimant and the government than would be the case in a
regime of heightened scrutiny. But here, the relative weight of
the impairment of the right and the strength of the government
interest must be placed in balance and the case decided.162 This,
of course, is where the critics of proportionality or any balancing
test will object most vigorously. When competing interests are
of the same nature, where, for example, each party’s loss can be
measured in dollars, balancing may be appropriate. But where
the competing interests to be balanced are of different kinds, is
the process hopelessly indeterminate?163 But as we have seen,
discomfort with the supposedly more determinative strict
scrutiny and minimal scrutiny tests has made them significantly
indeterminate already, a trend showing little sign of coming to a
halt.164
Aharon Barak responds to the criticism of proportionality
as, at best, no improvement on a simple test asking to balance
the importance of the individual right against the importance of
the social value sought by government, by explaining that the
test of proportionality at this stage is much more limited. “[T]he
issue is not the comparison of the general social importance of
the purpose (security, public safety, etc.) on the one hand and
the general social importance of preventing harm to the
constitutional right (equality, freedom of expression, etc.) on the
other.”165 Such balancing is clearly subject to criticism that it
improperly ignores the relevant facts of each case.166
Barak points out that proportionality as employed by
European, Canadian, and other courts calls for a test focusing
on the “marginal benefit” to social welfare and the “marginal
harm” to the right. Barak explains:
[Proportionality balancing] refers to the
comparison between the state of the purpose prior
to the law’s enactment, compared with that state
162. Id. at 340-70.
163. Barak recognizes the practical and theoretical problems with
balancing two things at disparate as social purpose and individual rights. Id.
at 350.
164. See supra notes 44-107 and accompanying text.
165. BARAK, supra note 4, at 351.
166. BARAK, supra note 4, at 351-52.
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afterwards, and the state of the constitutional
right prior to the law’s enactment compared with
its state after enactment. Accordingly, we are
comparing the marginal social importance of the
benefit gained by the limiting law and the
marginal social importance of preventing the
harm to the constitutional right caused by the
limiting law. The question is whether the weight
of the marginal social importance of the benefits
is heavier than the weight of the marginal social
importance of preventing the harm.167
This test does call for a consideration of the general overall
importance of both the right and the social interest involved. In
terms familiar to American lawyers, it will be important to
determine which rights are fundamental, which social interests
are compelling, and so on. A small marginal harm to a
fundamental right might outweigh a significant marginal harm
to a relatively unimportant social interest, or vice versa. But the
analysis is more precise than simply weighing the right in its
general nature against the general importance of the social
value sought by government.168
As a further clarification of the final balancing test of
proportionality, Barak calls for consideration of whether there
are alternative approaches that the government might take that
would be proportional under the marginal harms/benefits test
and would strike a better balance.169 At an earlier stage of the
proportionality analysis, we asked whether the government
action was necessary to achieve the social interest. At that
stage, the government action would fail only if there was an
easily identifiable alternative that would satisfy the social
interest to the full extent that the current practice does.170 At
this balancing stage, however, a more detailed analysis is called
for. Perhaps an alternative, although reasonably available, will
have some negative impact on the state’s ability to achieve its
social goals. At this stage of analysis, the degree to which that
167.
168.
169.
170.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5

Id.
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Id. at 321.
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is true is considered as part of the balancing of marginal benefits
and harms.171 The existence of a less restrictive alternative is
by no means unusual in American constitutional analysis.172
But here, it is not a question of the existence or non-existence of
such an alternative, but rather a more sophisticated inquiry into
how the alternative would shift the balance of the rights and
interests that is required.
The similarities and differences between the proportionality
analysis and the American approach of categorizing rights and
giving them, as a category, either exceptionally strong protection
or little at all, can be seen in a number of free speech cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1982, the Charter
of Rights and Freedom was added to the Canadian
Constitution.173 For the first time, the Charter entrenched a list
of rights limiting parliamentary supremacy, a doctrine inherited
from the United Kingdom. Unlike the language of the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution, however, the Charter
itself eschews any notion that the rights contained are absolute.
Section One of the Charter provides that the rights are “subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”174
Some degree of balancing, then, is clearly provided for.
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the
framework for analysis under Section One in R. v. Oakes.175
After determining that a Charter right had been limited and
that the government had responded by pointing to an interest
“of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a
constitutionally protected right,”176 an interest “pressing and
171. “The issue, therefore, focuses on the constitutionality of the weight
of the marginal social importance of the benefit and harm” of the individual
right and the government interest in the individual case. Id. at 352.
172. The existence of a less restrictive alternative was found to be present
and significant in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014),
for example.
173. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §§ 1-33 (U.K.). See
generally DAVID MILNE, THE NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1982).
174. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 1 (U.K.).
175. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
176. Id. at 138 (quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352
(Can.)).
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substantial in a free and democratic society,”177 the Court would
apply the following test:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully
designed to achieve the objective in question. They
must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on
irrational considerations. In short, they must be
rationally connected to the objective. Second, the
means, even if rationally connected to the
objective in this first sense, should impair “as
little as possible” the right or freedom in question.
Third, there must be a proportionality between
the effects of the measures which are responsible
for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the
objective which has been identified as of
“sufficient importance.”178
Some, focusing on the statement that the government must
impair the right “as little as possible,”179 saw the Oakes test as
something very close to the American strict scrutiny test.
However, subsequent cases made it clear that the reference to
proportionality calls for something more flexible and less
rigorous.180
American First Amendment law has largely consisted of
recognizing distinct categories of speech, with some entitled to
less, or even no constitutional protections.181 Over the years,
these categories have shifted, generally in the direction of
greater protection, but the instinct to create and maintain
categorical approaches remains. In contrast, Canadian courts
will apply the single proportionality test of Oakes to any instance
of communicative activity.
177. Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 139.
179. Id.
180. Justice Bertha Wilson advocated an approach to the Oakes test that
was similar to strict scrutiny in American law but concluded that “although
the Court continues to pay lip service to the strict Oakes test, in many of the
judgments it has in fact applied it in a less rigorous fashion.” Bertha Wilson,
Constitutional Advocacy, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 265, 267-69 (1992).
181. See generally Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech
Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495 (2015).
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The United States Supreme Court, using a categorical
approach to free speech cases, has wrestled with the question of
just what qualifies as speech as opposed to action. In the 1940’s,
the Court implicitly found that commercial advertising was
simply commercial activity rather than protected speech.182
Decades later, the Court abandoned that position, and has come
close to providing full First Amendment protection for
advertising, provided that it is not false or misleading.183
Canadian proportionality analysis approaches the question
differently. Initially, little or no time need be spent determining
whether advertising raises a free speech issue under the
Charter. Any activity that “conveys or attempts to convey a
meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within
the scope of the guarantee.”184 But that determination merely
begins the analysis. In assessing the provision of the Quebec
Consumer Protection Act prohibiting most commercial
advertising directed at children under the age of thirteen, the
Court went on to weigh the interests involved.
The Court found “[t]he protection of a group which is
particularly vulnerable to the techniques of seduction and
manipulation abundant in advertising” was a “pressing and
substantial” objective.185 While the evidence that children at or
close to age thirteen are particularly vulnerable was weaker
than that involving children younger than seven, the Court held
that the legislature must have some leeway in setting the precise
line at which children will be protected.186
The Court had no trouble finding “that a ban on advertising
directed to children is rationally connected to the objective of
protecting children from advertising.”187 On the less obvious
question of whether the means chosen impaired the right of
expression “as little as possible,” the Court chose something less
rigorous than an insistence on the least restrictive option.

182. See Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 53 (1942).
183. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
184. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 969 (Can.).
185. Id. at 987.
186. Id. at 990.
187. Id. at 991.
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While evidence exists that other less intrusive
options reflecting more modest objectives were
available to the government, there is evidence
establishing the necessity of a ban to meet the
objectives the government had reasonably set.
This Court will not, in the name of minimal
impairment . . . require legislatures to choose the
least ambitious means to protect vulnerable
groups.188
Taking account of both the expressive elements of the
advertising and its ultimate purpose to maximize commercial
profit, the Court struck the balance in favor of the regulation,
without minimizing either interest present in the case.
The proportionality test need not result in outcomes less
protective of commercial speech than American cases. In Rocket
v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons,189 the Court considered
serious restrictions placed on advertising by dentists pursuant
to authority granted to the Royal College by the Health
Disciplines Act. The regulation limited advertising to the name,
address, telephone number, and office hours of a dentist.190 It
also regulated the “means and manner” of advertising,
prohibiting any conduct that would be reasonably seen as
“disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional.”191 The Court had
“no difficulty” in holding that the objectives of maintaining high
levels of professionalism and protecting the public from
misleading advertising were sufficiently important to justify
infringement of the right of free expression.192 However, the
Court found that the regulation was disproportionate to its
objectives, particularly in its limitation of the amount of
accurate information that a dentist could convey.193 Again, the
Court noted that the motive of the advertising was “primarily

188.
189.
(Can.).
190.
191.
192.
193.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5

Id. at 999.
See Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 237.
at 237.
at 250.
at 247.
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economic.”194 But, at the same time, “expression of this kind
does serve an important public interest by enhancing the ability
of patients to make informed choices.”195 Commenting on the
best way to approach commercial speech cases, Justice
McLachlin wrote:
These two opposing factors—that the expression
is designed only to increase profit, and that the
expression plays an important role in consumer
choice—will be present in most if not all cases of
commercial expression. Their precise mix,
however, will vary greatly, which is why I believe
it is inadvisable to create a special and
standardized test for restrictions on commercial
expression, as has been done in the United
States.196
The use of a single test for the expression cases allows a full
examination of the competing interests by eliminating the
temptation to shut analysis down at an early stage by
categorization and the application of either too lenient, or too
strict a level of scrutiny, depending on the category of expression
at issue.
An even more striking example of the contrast between the
categorical approach and its various tests, on the one hand, and
the proportionality test, on the other, can be found in cases
involving pornography and obscenity. In 1957, to little surprise,
the United States Supreme Court held that obscenity was
unprotected by the First Amendment.197 The Court explained
that the reason for this was that obscene material lacked any
social value.198 While the judicial definition of obscenity changed
over the years,199 along with public tolerance of pornographic
194. Id. at 250-51.
195. Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 247
(Can.).
196. Id.
197. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514-15 (1957).
198. Id. at 484-85.
199. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966); Roth, 354
U.S. at 484 (holding that in order to prosecute material as obscene, the state
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material, the basic premise remains. Obscenity, largely defined
by the absence of any significant social value, as well as its level
of conflict with community standards,200 is an unprotected
category. While the definitional inquiry into the presence or
absence of social value in the work can be seen as presenting a
form of balancing, the focus on a definition to determine whether
the work fits a category limits a full consideration of the state
and individual interests involved.
In its 1992 decision, Butler v. The Queen,201 the Supreme
Court of Canada considered a challenge to the provision of the
Criminal Code of Canada prohibiting the possession, sale, and
public display of obscene material, defined as “any publication a
dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of
sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects,
namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence.”202
Initially, of course, the Canadian Supreme Court
determined that offensiveness could not remove obscenity from
the protection of the Charter’s speech provision.203 But once
again, this led not to automatic invalidation of the prohibition,
but rather to application of the Section One balancing test.
While the Court rejected the contention that Parliament could
justify infringement of a Charter freedom by merely invoking
“legal moralism,” (the use of the law to “impose a certain
standard of public and sexual morality, solely because it reflects
the conventions of a given community”)204 it accepted as
legitimate the Parliamentary goal of combating violence
“degradation, humiliation” and the maintenance of gender
inequality.205 Having found that the prohibition of obscenity
was rationally related to such goals, the Court turned to the
question of whether it advances them with minimal impairment
must prove it is “utterly without redeeming social importance”).
200. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatres v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). Each case broadened the scope of legally
obscene material to include work that lacked “serious” literary, artistic,
political or scientific value, rather than the Memoirs and Roth standard of
“utterly” lacking such value.
201. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
202. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 163(8) (Can.).
203. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 486-89 (Can.).
204. Id. at 492.
205. Id. at 493.
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to free speech right.
The Court concluded that the statute satisfied the test.206 In
doing so, it reviewed the existing tests for determining whether
a work is “undue exploitation,” and concluded that under a
synthesis of the tests, only a minimal amount of material would
actually be proscribed.207 Here, the Court’s balancing test
employs its own process of categorization, not to determine
whether obscenity is entitled to some Charter protection, but
rather to determine whether the questioned work falls within a
statute reasonably limited to cause minimum impairment of the
free speech right. Justice Sopinka stated that “[p]ornography
can be usefully divided into three categories: (1) explicit sex with
violence, (2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects
people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing, and (3)
explicit sex without violence that is neither degrading nor
dehumanizing.”208 Pornography that falls into the first category
“will almost always constitute the undue exploitation of sex;”209
work that falls into the second category “may be undue if the risk
of harm is substantial;”210 material in the third category “is
generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the
undue exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its
production.”211 In addition to all of this, the Court noted that
“materials which have scientific, artistic or literary merit” do not
constitute undue exploitation of sex; “the court must be generous
in its application” of this defense.212
The balance struck by the Court in Butler can be criticized
as being either too deferential to the legislature or too protective
of pornographic material, but the analysis does attempt to
recognize and take seriously both the right of expression and the
genuine social concerns presented. The Butler approach can be
contrasted with American Booksellers v. Hudnut,213 in which the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an Indianapolis
206. Id. at 504-09.
207. Id. at 484-85.
208. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 484 (Can.).
209. Id. at 485.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 505.
213. Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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ordinance that attempted to create liability for the
dissemination of pornography (not limited to obscenity) on the
ground that there is a causal relationship between the
pornography and gender-based violence or discrimination.214
Drawing a sharp categorical distinction between obscene
and all other sexually oriented material minimizes the need for
courts to seriously evaluate the strength of the contending
interests involved. The Indianapolis ordinance may well have
failed the Butler proportionality approach, but the categorical
approach eliminates the need to assess the actual strength of the
threats to individual expression and significant social objectives.
The maintenance of separate categories with different levels
of scrutiny, as opposed to a single proportionality test, can also
limit the ability of courts to use analogical reasoning where
appropriate. When considering a California statute limiting the
sale of violent video games to minors, the Supreme Court did
little more than note that, unlike obscenity, there was no
category of violent media that called for limited First
Amendment protection and struck the restriction down.215
Justice Breyer dissented.216
Breyer, who has shown some enthusiasm for proportionality
analysis in his separate opinions,217 noted that the restrictions
placed minimal burdens on video game companies that already
voluntarily labelled violent game as inappropriate for minors,
and on minors themselves, who could have access to the games
if they were given the games by parents or other adults who
made the actual purchases.218 He further noted that the Court
has consistently upheld restrictions that placed age limitations
on the sale or purchase of non-obscene sexually oriented
material.219 The balance of interests in each of these cases seems
roughly equivalent, yet the use of rigid categories, rather than a
214. Id. at 330-32.
215. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011).
216. Id. at 840-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
217. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 47-52 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (holding that a 25-year sentence under “three strikes” law is
“overkill”).
218. Brown, 564 U.S. at 848.
219. Id. at 848-49. While Breyer applies strict scrutiny, his stress on the
importance of the state interest in protecting children, and the minor intrusion
on free speech, closely resembles proportionality analysis.
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single proportionality test, forecloses careful consideration of
whether similar treatment is appropriate.
A proportionality test might well lead to more careful
consideration of legislation by legislators themselves. In United
States v. Stevens,220 the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute that prohibited the sale or distribution of videos of
intentional animal cruelty.221 The specific target of the statute
was a genre known as “crush videos,” aimed at viewers who
derive sexual pleasure from viewing small animals crushed by
The Court found the statute
women in high heels.222
significantly overbroad.223
The government defended the statute by maintaining that
depictions of animal cruelty should become a new category of
unprotected speech.224 The Court rejected the argument.225 At
the same time, Chief Justice Roberts noted that a more narrowly
focused statute might survive First Amendment review.226 The
categorical approach, with its all-or-nothing aspects, can easily
lead to legislation unconcerned with overbreadth. In contrast,
anticipating the use of proportionality by a reviewing court
should motivate legislators to more carefully tailor statues at
their inception.
There may be no area of constitutional rights litigation in
which continued adherence to the language of tier analysis has
led to more confusion then the Free Exercise Clause. The next
section will explore how the introduction of proportionality
might, whether changing outcomes or not, at least make what
courts are doing more transparent.
III. Proportionality in Free Exercise Analysis
The Supreme Court has been anything but consistent over
the years in its approach to the scope of the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. In 1878, the Court considered the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 472-75.
Id. at 468-70.
Id. at 471.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010).
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claim of a Mormon polygamist that the Free Exercise Clause
justified the performance of a religious duty, in this case, plural
marriage, despite the federal statute criminalizing polygamy in
the territories.227 The Court upheld the conviction, defining the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause in terms that made it not only
narrow, but also somewhat duplicative of the First Amendment’s
protection of speech.228
Drawing on a letter written by Thomas Jefferson,229 the
Court made a distinction between the limitation on
government’s power “to intrude . . . into the field of opinion, and
to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on
supposition of their ill tendency” and the legitimate power of
government “to interfere when principles break out into overt
acts against peace and good order.”230 In short, the Free Exercise
Clause protected belief and advocacy, but actions were only
protected by the general constitutional requirements that later
generations would refer to as the low-level “rational basis” test.
This remained the standard for free exercise analysis for
decades. Believers were successful in a number of cases that
presented situations involving speech-related issues.
In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,231 religious solicitors succeeded in
challenging a local licensing system that permitted the
administrator excessive discretion to label a cause as
nonreligious. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,232
the Court invalidated a compulsory flag-salute requirement as
applied to public school students who objected on religious
grounds.
Decisions involving religious advocacy were not always
decided in favor of the believers, however. In Chaplinsky v. New

227. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
228. Id. at 163 (holding that Congress could not “intrude his powers into
the field of opinion, and . . . restrain the profession or propagation of
principles,” but could act where “overt acts” threatened “peace and good
order.”).
229. Id. at 164 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury
Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802)).
230. Id. at 163 (quoting H.D. 82, 1779 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va.
1779)).
231. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
232. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Hampshire,233 the Defendant’s conviction for hurling “fighting
words” at a constable was affirmed with no particular attention
given to the religious message being delivered by the street
preacher.234 And in Prince v. Massachusetts,235 the Court
rejected a free exercise challenge to a statute prohibiting the use
of children in religious solicitations.236
Not until 1963 did the Supreme Court find in favor of a
petitioner claiming a free exercise exemption from a generally
applicable statutory duty where the claim rested entirely on
conduct rather than speech or belief alone. In Sherbert v.
Verner,237 a Seventh-Day Adventist was unable to qualify for
unemployment benefits from South Carolina due to her refusal
to accept appropriate employment that would require work on
Saturday, which would violate Adventist principles.238
The Court noted that South Carolina had forced the
applicant “to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion.”239 When such a burden is
placed on a believer, the Court held it would be necessary for the
state to justify it under the strict scrutiny analysis developed in
equal protection cases.240 The state would have to present a
compelling state interest and demonstrate that its refusal to
accommodate was necessary to satisfy that interest. The Court
dismissed as unconvincing the State’s suggestion that
“fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious
objection,” would threaten the unemployment compensation
funds.241
Sherbert established strict scrutiny as the norm for free
exercise analysis, and this was reinforced nine years later in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.242 Members of Amish communities had no
233. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
234. Id. at 570 (the trial court excluded as irrelevant testimony that the
defendant’s purpose was “to preach the true facts of the Bible”).
235. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
236. Id. at 170-71.
237. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
238. Id. at 406-07.
239. Id. at 404.
240. Id. at 406.
241. Id. at 407.
242. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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objection to sending their children to school through the eighth
grade (typically until age fourteen), but objected to the
requirement that their children attend public or private school
until age sixteen.243 The Amish maintained that the high
schools their children would have to attend until age sixteen
would impart values and skills likely to alienate the children
from the Amish “church community separate and apart from the
world and worldly influence,” a concept “central to their faith.”244
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that Wisconsin did
have a compelling interest in seeing that young people had
sufficient education to become productive members of society.245
But, taking account of the history of Amish self-sufficiency and
peaceful and law-abiding coexistence with the larger non-Amish
world, the Court held that Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate
that its insistence on two years of high school, with no exception
for the Amish, was necessary to further that interest.246
While Yoder could be viewed as a case presenting several
rights claims, including parental rights and speech-related First
Amendment rights along with free exercise claim, it was widely
viewed as a restatement of the Sherbert principle applying strict
scrutiny to free exercise cases. In the years following Yoder,
however, free exercise strict scrutiny appeared to be a far weaker
test than most would expect it to be.
Is achieving the optimal pedestrian crowd flow at the
Minnesota State Fair really a compelling state interest?247 Is
denying a military psychologist the right to wear a yarmulke on
military bases necessary to preserve the government’s
compelling interest in consistent uniform standards?248 These
and other cases led commentators to note that free exercise strict
scrutiny was rather feeble.249
243. Id. at 210.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 221.
246. Id. at 234-36.
247. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981) (holding that there was no free exercise exemption from regulation
limiting solicitation at fairgrounds to fixed spot).
248. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that there
was no free exercise exemption from military uniform requirements).
249. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437,
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When the Court considered Employment Division v.
Smith250 in 1990, few would have expected a serious shift in the
articulation or application of the free exercise analytical
standards. Claimants were Native American Church members
who ingested peyote for sacramental purposes.251 Their peyote
use led to their discharge from employment by a private drug
rehabilitation program and their inability to qualify for
unemployment compensation because they had been dismissed
for misconduct.252 The Oregon Supreme Court upheld their right
to an exemption claim based on the Free Exercise Clause.253
As a case involving unemployment compensation, Smith
could be seen as squarely within the scope of Sherbert. But
unlike earlier unemployment-related cases, this one presented a
“war on drugs” justification for the denial of the exemption. The
Court has shown little inclination to interfere with government
efforts to fight illegal drug use, whether the issue presented
involves the Fourth Amendment,254 the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause,255 or federalism.256 Few would have expected
Smith to prevail; most would have anticipated the Court to apply
its “feeble” version of free exercise strict scrutiny257 and reverse
the Oregon Supreme Court. But, as discussed above, Justice
Scalia writing for a five-justice majority, held that strict scrutiny
was inappropriate when the exemption sought was from a
statute of general applicability, and did not actually
discriminate against religion.258
446-47 (1994) (playing on Gunther’s phrase, the authors state that postSherbert strict scrutiny had become “strict in theory but feeble in fact”).
250. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
251. Id. at 874.
252. Id.
253. See Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988), rev’d 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
254. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that
a minor traffic violation justifies police stop in “high drug area”).
255. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that a
school may punish students for speech that is perceived as advocating use of
illegal drugs).
256. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress
may penalize grower of marijuana for own use under the Commerce Clause).
257. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 249.
258. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.

41

BESCHLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

5/8/18 10:27 PM

NO MORE TIERS?

425

Given Justice Scalia’s general hostility toward balancing
tests,259 it would seem likely that he intended to clarify free
exercise analysis and make it more predictable. Subsequent
developments, however, have seriously undermined this goal.
While the academic response to Smith was mixed,260 reaction in
the political world was sharply negative.
Religious
conservatives saw a threat to believers, while religious and
secular liberals saw an unfortunate contraction of individual
rights. Congress responded to Smith with the 1993 enactment
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,261 which essentially
instructed federal courts to apply pre-Smith standards to free
exercise claims. In its first encounter with the Act, the Supreme
Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores,262 that the Act was
unconstitutional, at least insofar as it set a standard for review
of state and local government actions.
Congress had based the Act on its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on state action.263
Revisiting a longstanding debate concerning the scope of this
authority, the Court held that it did not include the authority to
define the scope of the right itself, a task entrusted to the courts,
but only to provide enforcement of the right as defined by the
Court.264 The scope of the Free Exercise Clause, as defined by
the Court, extends no further than to protect against
antireligious discrimination.265 Here, the Court saw the Act as
attempting to extend the scope of the right to include protection
against application of neutral statutes of general application to
religious believers in some circumstances.266
But the City of Boerne decision only invalidated the Act
insofar as it invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the
states. Congress may, of course, amend its own statutes, and
259. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
260. Compare Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (critical of Smith), with Marci
A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099 (defending Smith).
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
262. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
263. Id. at 529.
264. Id. at 529-36.
265. Id. at 529.
266. Id. at 532.
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the Act remains effective where religious exemptions are sought
against federal statutes.267 And Congress, relying on its Article
I powers enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act.268 As the title makes clear, the Act dealt with free
exercise claims in two different contexts, each at the state or
local level.
Where a local land use restriction places a “substantial
burden” on religious exercise, it must be both nondiscriminatory
toward religious uses, and also be the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling government interest.269 Similarly,
regulations that substantially limit free exercise by prisoners or
other institutionalized persons in institutions receiving federal
financial support are entitled to an exemption unless the state
can meet a similar test.270
States are free, of course, to extend rights contained in their
own constitutions beyond the scope of the analogous federal
right, provided that the decision does not conflict with another
federally-guaranteed right. In the wake of Smith, many states
took legislative or judicial action to interpret state free exercise
guarantees to require Sherbert-like strict scrutiny to justify
refusals to grant religious exemptions to generally applicable
statutes.271 While one may argue that this creates a potential
conflict with the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court has suggested that states have some leeway in
balancing free exercise and non-establishment principles.272

267. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006) (strict scrutiny applied to free exercise exemption claim against
federal statute).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (applying the Act
in a case brought by a prisoner denied access to religious literature and
ceremonial items).
271. See generally Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States,
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1999).
272. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that the state may
apply its own establishment clause more strictly than called for by the First
Amendment Establishment Clause); but see Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that Missouri’s state
constitutional establishment clause must yield to free exercise demands of
equal treatment of religious institution).
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Thus, the appropriate level of scrutiny in free exercise cases
will depend on whether the claim is based on the First
Amendment, federal statutes, or state law. If the relevant test
is the pre-Smith, Sherbert standard, a more interesting question
arises. The language of compelling government interest and
least restrictive means suggests a test that will be extremely
difficult for government to satisfy. But as we have seen, during
the decades between Sherbert and Smith, the Court found ways
to uphold government refusals to grant exemptions while giving
lip service to strict scrutiny.273
Balancing factors can find the way into cases that on their
face call for strict scrutiny. In free exercise cases, an initial
inquiry as to the religious nature of the claim itself can derail
strict scrutiny. Similarly, when the claim is based on a statute
protecting against “substantial” interference with free exercise,
the claim can fail at this stage if the court holds that the
government interference is less than substantial.274 And even
where the strict scrutiny test is invoked, pre-Smith cases
demonstrate the extent to which courts may give substantial
deference in situations involving prison authorities or military
decisions.275
Proportionality may or may not lead to different outcomes
in free exercise cases, but it would create a simple, and more
sensitive approach.
Smith itself can be compared to a
remarkably similar case from the Constitutional Court of South
Africa. In Prince v. President of the Cape Law Society,276 the
Appellant had been barred from admission to the practice of law
because he had been convicted of illegal possession of marijuana
and insisted he would continue to use marijuana as required by
his Rastafarian religious belief.277

273. See supra notes 245-244 and accompanying text.
274. See generally Karla L. Chaffee & Dwight H. Merriam, Six Fact
Patterns of Substantial Burden in RLUIPA: Lessons for Potential Litigants, 2
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 437 (2009).
275. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
276. See Prince v. President of the Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA 784 (CC)
(S. Afr.).
277. Id. ¶ 142.
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The Court engaged in an “evaluation of proportionality” as
called for by the provision of the South Africa Constitution that
provides:
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only
in terms of law of general application to the extent
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in
an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account
all relevant factors, including—
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the
limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its
purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the
purpose.278
Applying this standard, the Court rejected the applicant’s
claim for a religiously based exemption.279 In doing so, the
majority explicitly rejected the majority view of the United
States Supreme Court in Smith, endorsing instead the Smith
minority approach, which the South African Court characterized
as a “balancing analysis.”280 That the Court struck the balance
in this case in favor of the government is evidence that
proportionality does not necessarily result in greatly enhanced
protection for the individual. Although he wrote in dissent,
Justice Sachs no doubt expressed the view of the South Africa
Court as to the value of proportionality:
Limitations analysis under our Constitution is
based not on formal or categorical reasoning but
on processes of balancing and proportionality as
required by section 36. This Court has accordingly
rejected the view of the majority in the United
278. Id. ¶ 128 n.49 (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1)).
279. Id. ¶ 139.
280. Id. ¶ 128.
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States Supreme Court that it is an inevitable
outcome of democracy that in a multi-faith society
minority religions may find themselves without
remedy against burdens imposed upon them by
formally neutral laws. Equally, on the other hand,
it would not accept as an inevitable outcome of
constitutionalism that each and every statutory
restriction on religious practice must be
invalidated. On the contrary, limitations analysis
under section 36 is antithetical to extreme
positions which end up setting the irresistible
force of democracy and general law enforcement,
against the immovable object of constitutionalism
and protection of fundamental rights.281
A further example of how the use of proportionality analysis
in free exercise cases can lead to a more sensitive consideration
of relevant factors is found in the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Movement Laique Quebecois v. Saguenay
(City).282 Plaintiffs challenged the practice of the Saguenay City
Council of beginning each session with a Christian prayer.283
Only months earlier, the United States Supreme Court had
considered a similar factual situation in Town of Greece v.
Galloway.284 In Town of Greece, the Court classified the case as
one presenting an Establishment Clause issue, and decided,
primarily on the basis of precedent, that legislative bodies may
open their session with formal spoken prayer.285
The Canadian Constitution does not contain an equivalent
of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. But the
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that government
neutrality toward religion can be seen as an aspect of the
protection of religious freedom of the individual. And so, in cases

281. Id. ¶ 155 (Sachs, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
282. Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3
(Can.).
283. Id. at 14.
284. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
285. Id. at 1820 (Justice Kennedy relied on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983), which upheld the practice of the Nebraska State Legislature in
opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a chaplain).
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involving such issues as Sunday closing laws286 and prayer in
public schools,287 the Court has reached results similar to those
decided in the United States under the Establishment Clause.288
Ironically, however, in these legislative prayer cases, the
Canadian Court more rigorously protects non-establishment
principles, despite the absence of an Establishment Clause, than
the United States Court.
In a subtle way, separating the Establishment Clause from
the Free Exercise Clause may place too much emphasis, in
Establishment Clause cases, on the apparent blameworthiness
of government action and too little on the individual right
involved. Recognizing government neutrality as a means of
assuring freedom of religion shifts the focus to the individual
rights claimant.
With the focus on the rights granted to the plaintiff, the
Court then summarized the test to be applied:
[T]he criteria developed by the Court in
interpreting s. 1 of the Canadian Charter apply to
the interpretation of s. 9.1 (Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at
p. 980; Ford, at pp. 769-71). The impugned
provision must therefore satisfy the justification
test enunciated in Oakes, which requires the state
to prove on a balance of probabilities (1) that the
legislative objective is of sufficient importance, in
the sense that it relates to pressing and
substantial concerns, and (2) that the means
chosen to achieve the objective are proportional.
This second requirement has three components:
(i) the means chosen must be rationally connected
to the objective; (ii) they must impair the right in
question as little as possible; and (iii) they must
not so severely trench on individual or group
286. See R v. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
287. See Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ. (1988), 65 O.R. 2d 641 (Can.
Ont. C.A.).
288. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating required
recitation of prayer in public schools); but see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws).
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rights that the objective is outweighed by the
seriousness of the intrusion.289
Applying this test, the Court found that the infringement of
the rights of non-believers was substantial, and that little
attention needed to be paid to much of the balancing test since
the City had failed to present an important government interest
in the practice.290 One important point to note is that the
Canadian Charter, like many national and international
declarations of individual rights dating to the post-World War II
era, expands the freedom to include “conscience” in addition to
religion,291 making the sometimes thorny question of what
qualifies as a religion for First Amendment purposes irrelevant.
The use of a single proportionality test will not necessarily
lead to outcomes significantly similar or different than the use
of separate categorical tests, whether in freedom of religion
cases or elsewhere. But it does encourage serious consideration
of all of the interests presented. An Establishment Clause case
is also about freedom of religion; a case seeking a Free Exercise
exception from a general duty calls into question government’s
obligation of religious neutrality. These overlaps have certainly
been noticed, but the tendency to place a case in one or another
category, leading to one or another separate analytical test, may
lead to overvalue or undervalue one of the competing interest
involved.
In 2013, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
conducted hearings and issued a report considering the
conflicting positions presented by demands for statutory or
judicial exemption for religious believers from duties of
nondiscrimination imposed upon government, individuals and
In
institutions, both religious and other institutions.292
addressing the conflicts between free exercise and
nondiscrimination values, the Commission would necessarily
289. Mouvement laïque québécois c. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3,
para. 90 (Can.) (citation omitted).
290. Id. ¶ 150.
291. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948).
292. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 1-4 (2016).
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need to consider a number of contexts presenting a number of
statutory and constitutional sources of law.
If an exemption for a federal statutory duty was denied, the
relevant standard was that contained in the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.293 If an exemption from a state
statutory duty was denied, the relevant standard might be the
Smith framework, or a more stringent standard set forth in
federal law or state Religious Freedom Acts.294 And in the
background of these statutory attempts to protect religious
freedom stands the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
The Commission’s 2016 report stressed that Smith and
statutory reactions to it made no changes to the demands of the
Establishment Clause.295 At what point does the grant of
exemption
to
religiously-motivated
objectors
raise
Establishment Clause issues? And in addition to the likely need
to consider more than one source of law, a claim of an
entitlement to an exemption might be raised by an individual, a
church, a non-profit institution with church affiliation, or even a
for-profit corporation with no obvious religious purpose.
The Commissioners differed sharply, in the official report
and recommendations, with the majority findings and
recommendations coming down “resoundingly in favor of
nondiscrimination”296 and generally against accommodations:
(1) schools must be allowed to insist on inclusive
values; 2) throughout history, religious doctrines
accepted at one time later become viewed as
discriminatory,
with
religions
changing
accordingly; 3) without exemptions, groups would
not use the pretext of religious doctrines to
discriminate; 4) a doctrine that distinguishes
between beliefs (which should be protected) and
conduct (which should conform to the law) is fairer
and easier to apply; 5) third parties, such as
employees, should not be forced to live under the
religious doctrines of their employers [unless the
293.
294.
295.
4-5).
296.

See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 25-26 (findings
See id. at 42 (statement of Commissioner Peter Kirsanow).
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employer is allowed to impose such constraints by
virtue of the ministerial exception]; 6) a basic
[civil] right as important as the freedom to marry
should not be subject to religious beliefs; and 7)
even a widely accepted doctrine such as the
ministerial exemption should be subject to review
as to whether church employees have religious
duties.
Further, specifically with regard to number (2)
above, religious doctrines that were widely
accepted at one time came to be deemed highly
discriminatory, such as slavery, homosexuality
bans, and unequal treatment of women, and that
what is considered within the purview of religious
autonomy at one time would likely change.
Recommendations
1. Overly-broad religious exemptions unduly
burden nondiscrimination laws and policies.
Federal and state courts, lawmakers, and policymakers at every level must tailor religious
exceptions to civil liberties and civil rights
protections as narrowly as applicable law
requires.
2. RFRA protects only religious practitioners’
First Amendment free exercise rights, and it does
not limit others’ freedom from governmentimposed religious limitations under the
Establishment Clause.
3. In the absence of controlling authority to the
contrary such as a state-level, RFRA-type statute,
the recognition of religious exemptions to
nondiscrimination laws and policies should be
made pursuant to the holdings of Employment
Division v. Smith, which protect religious beliefs
rather than conduct.
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4. Federal legislation should be considered to
clarify that RFRA creates First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause rights only for individuals and
religious institutions and only to the extent that
they do not unduly burden civil liberties and civil
rights
protections
against
status-based
discrimination.
5. States with RFRA-style laws should amend
those statutes to clarify that RFRA creates First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause rights only for
individuals and religious institutions. States with
laws modeled after RFRA must guarantee that
those statutes do not unduly burden civil liberties
and
civil
rights
with
status-based
discrimination.297
In contrast, dissenting Commissioners argued just as
vigorously for broad recognition of statutory and constitutional
protection for religiously-based objectors.298 The existence of
separate analytical tests for free exercise and nondiscrimination
claims (not to mention the Establishment Clause) may not be
the main reason for the sharp, nearly polar opposite, conclusions
of the commissioners. But perhaps a single proportionality
analysis might force each side to more seriously consider
countervailing values, instead of simply declaring themselves
champions of nondiscrimination and nonestablishment, on one
side, or religious freedom on the other.

297. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 26-27
(alteration in original).
298. See id. at 42-113 (statement of Commissioner Peter Kirsanow
arguing that “[t]he findings and recommendations in this report should serve
as an alarm to liberty-loving Americans”). While sharply disagreeing with the
majority, Kirsanow voted in favor of the report only in order to allow the report
to go forward. Id.
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IV. Conclusion
The use of different tiers of analysis for different categories
of rights claims might be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to
achieve a level of predictability and precision that are lacking in
a more generally applicable balancing test. Yet the attempt to
categorize claims as entitled to either little respect or extremely
powerful constitutional protection has hardly succeeded in
clarifying constitutional law.
The last several decades have shown that a more openended balancing approach is not only desirable, but perhaps
inevitable. The creation of intermediate scrutiny and First
Amendment tests for categories once considered outside of the
protection of the Amendment present the clearest evidence of
this. But the persistence of labels such as strict scrutiny or the
rational basis test, even in cases where they are applied in ways
that would puzzle their creators, may be even more significant.
How strict is strict scrutiny if it is clearly not “fatal in fact?”299
Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more obvious than in current
free exercise cases, where courts must puzzle over what
Sherbert-like strict scrutiny really entails.
The problems with the maintenance of different tiers of
constitutional analysis has not gone entirely unnoticed in the
Supreme Court.
Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed
discomfort with the division of equal protection cases into those
calling for strict scrutiny and others by noting that there is only
one equal protection clause rather than multiple clauses for
More recently, Justice Beyer has
different classes.300
occasionally suggested an open-ended proportionality test as an
alternative to current analytical approaches.301
The use of the proportionality test employed by Canadian,
European and other courts to evaluate constitutional rights
claims brings together all of the factors currently employed in
the various American tests, allowing for full consideration of
both the interests of the individual and the government in each
299. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
300. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 478
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 230-31 (1982) (Marshall, J. concurring).
301. See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
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case. In any particular case, it may or may not lead to a different
outcome than the currently used tests. But it avoids ignoring
significant interests downplayed, if not ignored, by the tests.
Adoption of proportionality as a single balancing approach
will likely make many uneasy. Libertarians will fear weakening
of the supposed advantages of strict scrutiny; majoritarians will
fear extending more protection to those currently protected only
by low-level rational bans analysis. But both positions are
already eroding, and it may be time to recognize that the
insights present in each of the current tiers of analysis can be
preserved by building them into a generalized proportionality
test.
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